Is Believe in God Properly Basic?

Introduction

In this paper I shall concern myself with the question of whether theistic belief could be rational without propositional evidence or any support by argument. In a series of articles Plantinga juxtaposes what he calls ‘Reformed epistemology’ (or Calvinist epistemology) with ‘classical foundationalism’ (which he finds in Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Hume, and many others) and concludes that the theist is rationally justified in believing in God without much further evidence. 1 Plantinga’s method is first to criticize classical foundationalism. After showing its inadequacy, he then identifies certain immediate non-inferential beliefs which most persons would agree are reasonable to hold, such as “I see a tree”, “I ate breakfast this morning”, or “that person is in pain.”

Having established the reasonableness of such beliefs, he claims that religious beliefs are analogous to such commonly held nontheistic beliefs.

What I would examine carefully is his claim that belief in God is properly basic within some non-classical version of foundationalism. First, the basic theory of Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology shall be laid out. Then, I shall argue that Plantinga’s position is untenable since the method given by his account for demarcating proper and improper basic beliefs raises some difficulties.

2. Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology

2.1 The Evidentialist Objection

Plantinga’s reformed epistemology is intended to rebut what he calls ‘the evidentialist objection’ to theistic belief. At issue in the debate between Plantinga and evidentialists is the question of what kinds of beliefs can be properly basic. According to this objection, made by W. K. Clifford and developed by contemporary antitheologians like Michael Scriven and Brand Blanshard, theistic belief is ‘irrational or unreasonable or not rationally acceptable or intellectually irresponsible or noetically substandard’ 2 unless there are sufficient reasons for it.3 Thus the evidentialist denies that belief in God, in Plantinga’s terms, is ‘properly basic’. If the belief that God exists is properly basic, then, of course, the evidentialist objection fails.

For the objection assumes that this belief is one which should be accepted only on the basis of, and in proportion to the strength of, the relevant evidence. And, if properly basic, the belief that God exists is not of that kind, but is such that accepting it without evidence is epistemologically proper.

Plantinga traces evidentialism to the epistemological theory which he calls ‘classical foundationalism’.4 The general theory of foundationalism is that beliefs are justified in one of two ways: They are either based on other justified beliefs, or are justified without such dependence (or, to use Plantinga’s term of choice, properly basic). These properly basic beliefs are generally understood to derive their justification from the circumstances or experiences that give rise to them, rather than from any doxastic phenomenon. These beliefs provide foundation from which all other justified beliefs are justified. A belief is justified, then, only if it is properly basic or can trace its support to one or more properly basic beliefs.

Plantinga identifies two epistemological strains that unite in classical foundationalism. First, there is ancient and medieval foundationalism, epitomized in Aquinas, in which beliefs are properly basic just in case they are self-evident or evident to the senses. A self-evident belief is of a proposition that is ‘perceived immediately by the mind’, such as “2 + 2 = 4”, “all bachelors are unmarried males”, and “the whole is equal to the sum of its parts” - one known ‘through itself (per se nota)’. 5 These propositions are like the simple truths of logic and arithmetic - those that present themselves to us as obviously true, so that their denial would force us immediately into some absurdity. Beliefs that are evident to the senses are reports of immediate experience - such as “there is a piece of paper before me”, “there is a tree before me”, and “the wall that I am looking at is yellow”. The second strain is modern foundationalism, which maintains that beliefs can be properly basic just in case they are self-evident or incorrigible. Incorrigible propositions are those about one’s states of consciousness in which one cannot mistakenly believe what is not true, such as “I seem to see a red ball” or “I think, therefore, I am”, or “I am in pain”. To sum up, the classical foundationalist’s principle may be defined as follows:

(1) A proposition p is properly basic for a person S if and only if p is either self-evident to S or incorrigible for S or evident to the senses for S . 6

The argument from (1) to evidentialism is clear. Beliefs are justified without evidence (properly basic) only if they are self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses. Hence, no theistic belief is properly basic.

So, to the question of what is wrong with theistic belief so that it is not properly basic, the foundationalist replies that it is non-self-evident, corrigible, non-perceptual belief, and no such belief is properly basic.

It seems to be Plantinga’s contention that classical foundationalism is one of the strongest motivations for evidentialism. So Plantinga argues against classical foundationalism, and thus seeks to undercut the evidentialist objection to the Reformed epistemology.

Plantinga levels two charges against classical foundationalism. First, he notes that (1) would deny properly basic status to many beliefs that it seems quite natural to regard as properly basic. Plantinga has in mind perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs, and beliefs about other minds. For instance, my belief that I had lunch a few hours ago seems to be properly basic even though it is not self-evident, not evident to the senses, or not incorrigible. These follow neither deductively, inductively, nor on a probabilistic basis from the basic beliefs allowed by (1). This shows that (1) is false or at least unjustified, since surely many beliefs about other minds and the past are justified.

Second and more important, Plantinga argues that the classical foundationalism is self-referentially incoherent - it cannot account for its own justified acceptance.7 In order for S to be justified in accepting classical foundationalism, Plantinga notes, (1) must be either properly basic for S or derivable from that which is properly basic for S. No classical foundationalist has ever argued for (1) from propositions that meet its own criteria for proper basicality. But it seems that (1) is neither self-evident, nor incorrigible, nor evident to the sense. If (1) is properly basic, it is false - since it claims that no propositions of that sort is properly basic. So, Plantinga concludes, either (1) is false, or it cannot be justifiably believed. The upshot of this criticism is both to show the inadequacy of the classical foundationalist’s criteria of proper basicality and to claim that there are no good reasons to suppose belief in God cannot itself be accepted as properly basic.

2.2 The Great Pumpkin Objection

To say that belief in God does not have to conform to foundationalist criteria is not to say that it stands without need of justification. Plantinga is aware that an apparent difficulty arises here. If God’s existence can be rationally accepted even though it is supported by no argument or evidence, why couldn’t just about any belief be accepted in the same way? Why couldn’t astrology, say, or voodoo be accepted as properly basic beliefs? 8

The elimination of foundationalism may have got rid of unduly harsh restrictions on proper basicality, but now it looks like we might have the opposite problem. Hasn’t Plantinga thrown open the floodgates to superstition and irrationality? 9 If we eliminate the foundationalist criteria for proper basicality but have no new standards to put in their place, what is to prevent anyone from claiming just about any sort of belief as properly basic?

Plantinga calls this the ‘Great Pumpkin’ objection because it charges that Reformed epistemology would license nearly any sort of belief as properly basic, even the belief that the Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween. Far from allowing any and every belief to count as properly basic, Plantinga replies, Calvinistic epistemology recognizes that beliefs can be properly basic in some circumstances but not in others. 10 In other words, properly basic beliefs are those which arise out of appropriate corresponding circumstances. Improper basic beliefs lack the appropriating grounding experiences. So, to take the belief in the Great Pumpkin, we see that there is obviously no corresponding experience which serves as its grounds.

Why, Plantinga asks, would anyone think that such claims commit Reformed epistemologists to the view that anything goes? Perhaps underlying that charge is the recognition that Plantinga has eliminated the foundationalist criteria for proper basicality but has offered no better criteria to take their place. Plantinga replies that some judgments about proper basicality are possible even in the absence of precise, well-defined criteria. Consider an analogy: Surely “the slithy toves did gyre and gymble in the wabe” can be judged meaningless even if we do not possess absolutely general criteria that would unambiguously settle every question about meaning. 11 Likewise, Plantinga holds, certain beliefs can be judged properly basic and others not even in the absence of criteria to judge justifiably that “1 + 1 = 2” is properly basic but that “The Great Pumpkin will return next Halloween” is not.

Here, it should be noted that, when Plantinga criticizes strong foundationalism, he is not rejecting foundationalism as such. He still accepts the foundationalist’s distinction between basic and derived beliefs, as well as the assumption that there must be properly basic beliefs from which all of our other beliefs have to be derived if they are to be rationally justified. What he rejects is merely the classical foundationalist’s overly restrictive criterion for what can qualify as properly basic beliefs.

How, then, should one decide what beliefs can be properly basic? Or, how, then, should one approach the problem of the criteria for proper basicality? Here, Plantinga does not offer any criteria for proper basicality, but he does suggest that the manner of arriving at such will be broadly inductive.

The proper way to arrive at such a criterion is, broadly speaking, inductive. We must assemble examples of beliefs and conditions such that the former are obviously properly basic in the latter, and examples of beliefs and conditions such that the former are not properly basic in the latter. We must then frame hypotheses as to the necessary and sufficient conditions of proper basicality and test these hypotheses by reference to those examples. 12

Plantinga, following Chisholm, pursues the option of ‘particularism’ rather than ‘methodism’. 13 Stated simply, the particularist holds that one develops a criterion, say for proper basicality, by comparing it to examples one already considers properly basic. The criteria are subsequent to our already having gathered examples of properly basic beliefs. One then tests the adequacy of the criteria by reference to those examples. Why, then, says Plantinga, cannot our criteria be developed so as to include belief in God?

More importantly, one should notice that although belief in God is basic, (it does not rest on other beliefs adduced as evidence for it), it is not ‘groundless’. For any belief q,...qn there is a corresponding set of circumstances that spontaneously and non-inferentially gives rise to my belief and justifies me in my taking it as basic. For example, consider the belief, “I see a cat on the mat.” Typically I do not hold such a belief on the basis of other beliefs; it is basic for me. But this belief is not groundless - it corresponds to an appropriate set of circumstances, namely, the experiences consisting of my being appeared to in an appropriate way; in this case ‘catly’ and ‘matly’. Plantinga says, My being appeared to in this characteristic way (together with other circumstances) is what confers on me the right to hold the belief in question; this is what justifies me in accepting it. We could say, if we wish, that this experience is what justified me in holding it; this is the ground of my justification, and by extension, the ground of the belief itself. 14

How, then, can theists be sure of having criteria that permit them to regard belief in God as properly basic? Simply by making belief in God one of their examples of obvious proper basicality. 15 In other words, since our criteria in large part will derive from what we initially take as obviously properly basic, those criteria will naturally permit the taking of such beliefs as properly basic.

What, then, are the circumstances in which Plantinga regards belief in God as obviously properly basic? He gives a number of such circumstances.

Upon reading the Bible, one may be impressed with a deep sense that God is speaking to him. Upon having done what I know cheap, or wrong, or wicked, I may feel guilty in God’s sight and form the belief God disapproves of what I have done. Upon confession and repentance I may feel forgiven, forming the belief God forgives me for what I have done. A person in grave danger may turn to God asking for his protection and help; and of course he or she then has the belief that God is indeed able to hear and help if He sees fit. When life is sweet and satisfying, a spontaneous sense of gratitude may well up within the soul; someone in this condition may thank and praise the Lord for his goodness, and will of course have the accompanying belief that indeed the Lord is to be thanked and praised. 16

Plantinga claims that belief in God is properly grounded in other beliefs, such as “God is speaking to me” and “God forgives me”, which are properly basic. They are analogous to perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs, and beliefs about other minds. In proper circumstances (e.g., where there is no reason to believe that my noetic structure 17 is defective), my having an experience of a certain sort confers on me the right to hold the belief in question.18 In like manner, having religious experiences is properly basic in the right circumstances. In this sense, strictly speaking, it is not belief in God that is properly basic for Plantinga, but rather beliefs such as the belief that God is speaking to me, that God forgives me, that God has created all this, and that God is to be thanked and praised. 19 However, since beliefs of this sort self-evidently entail that God exists, Plantinga believes that there is no harm in speaking a bit loosely and talking as if the relatively abstract, high-level proposition “God exists” is itself properly basic. 20

Critical Considerations

According to Plantinga, there are many kinds of beliefs which can function as properly basic. As such they need not be based on the evidence of other propositions. These properly basic beliefs are grounded, and hence justified not by other propositions which serve as evidence but experience of a certain kind. 21 Examples of the kinds of belief which can be properly basic are perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs, beliefs about other minds. The classical foundationalist’s criteria are defective because of self-referentially inconsistent or questioning-begging evidentialist presuppositions about what can count as a basic belief.

But to say that classical foundationalism fails in its task, and theistic beliefs do not have to conform to foundationalist criteria is not to say that belief in God is properly basic. Plantinga’s strategy is based on the argument that some beliefs about God’s action and attributes can function as properly basic beliefs, and since these beliefs entails God’s existence, theism is thereby justified.

Let us return to the ‘Great Pumpkin’ objection. Plantinga’s reply was, first, that not all judgments about proper basicality need be grounded in criteria, and second, that Reformed epistemology allows for the inductive formulation of such criteria. These replies certainly show that Plantinga himself is not required to accept, say, astrology or voodoo as properly basic. But is this the core of problem? Is the important question whether or not Reformed epistemology allows Plantinga to hold these things as properly basic? The crucial issue is whether Reformed epistemology provides any grounds for denying that others have the right to make such claims. One problem with Plantinga’s account is that the precise relationship between the grounds for our belief and the belief itself is not adequately specified.

Plantinga makes it clear that not just any belief can be properly basic but that a properly basic belief is not groundless although lacking discursive evidence. Thus, some beliefs are not properly basic because they lack grounding.
Furthermore, Plantinga claims that arriving at the criterion for proper basicality leads to identifying belief in the Great Pumpkin as irrational. But why should the Great Pumpkinite accept this? Admittedly, belief in the Great Pumpkin is not something I take to be rational, but what if we come upon some tribe that believes it is? Suppose this tribe has read Plantinga, followed his inductive procedure, and takes Great Pumpkin belief as properly basic. Suppose they even specify their criterion for proper basicality and it does not lead to any incoherence. What is Plantinga to say?

Plantinga’s reply is that we do not have any natural inclination to believe in the Great Pumpkin, whereas we do have a natural inclination to believe in God. 22 Nevertheless, Plantinga would admit the rationality of Great Pumpkin belief insofar as such belief actually resembles theistic belief.

How would it be possible, once the inductive procedure is completed, for Great Pumpkin belief to be rejected as irrational? First, if no one ever has Great Pumpkin experiences and simply chooses arbitrarily to believe in the Great Pumpkin, no such belief is rational. It is not grounded. Second, if one does have Great Pumpkin experiences to ground such belief and Plantinga still rejects the belief as irrational, he must mean that no Great Pumpkinite’s Great Pumpkin belief is irrational. At this point, he must have some independent reason for rejecting Great Pumpkin belief. He seems to think that if one inductively arrives at the criterion for proper basicality and the criterion rules out Great Pumpkin belief, then no one’s evidentially unsupported belief in the Great Pumpkin could be rational. But pace Plantinga, what if the Great Pumpkin takes his belief to be properly basic and thus arrives at a different criterion? Plantinga’s response is inconsistent with his inductive procedure and its potential results. To be consistent, he must allow for such a potentiality.

To sum up, Plantinga does not give any criteria to help us distinguish in advance of his inductive procedure unacceptable from acceptable candidates for proper basicality, but merely suggests that the manner of arriving at such will be broadly inductive. Plantinga’s point is that it is not his concern to make judgments about other people’s rationality.

Perhaps his only concern is to show that the fact that someone accepts the existence of God as properly basic doesn’t mean that that person is thereby committed to accepting practically any belief as properly basic. Maybe we can speak for ourselves, but we cannot impose standards of proper basicality on others. Consequently, it leads Plantinga to claim that there is a certain relativity in the process of searching for criteria for proper basicality.

Since different people regard different beliefs as non-inferentially obvious, it is not to be expected that the inductive formulation of criteria will result in the same set of criteria for everybody. If two people start with fundamentally different views of proper basicality, then the rules that they construct on those views will also be quite different.

They may even be incompatible. However, since a person’s rules derive from her views, she can hardly expect her rules to apply to someone who starts with a fundamentally different set of examples. This seems to imply that a belief might be rationally accepted as basic by one person but equally rationally rejected by another. Again, it all depends on which set of beliefs is initially taken as obviously properly basic.

3. Conclusion

Platinga rejects a certain criterion for proper basicality, since he believes that God is properly basic, but he does not argue for a certain criteria. But one does not need to argue for a certain criterion in order to be justified in rejecting another. A person needs to start where he is at when taking the beliefs he has and coming up with a criteria for proper basicality. For Christians, this will include God’s being properly basic, but it will not include the Great Pumpkin or some other belief that does not seem basic to the Christian.

1Cf. Alvin Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God (henceforth RBG),” in Reason and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 16-93; “Is Belief in God Rational?,” in Rationality and Religious Belief, ed. C. F. Delaney (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), 1979, pp. 7-29; “Is Belief in God Properly Basic?,” Nous 15 (1981): pp. 41-51.
2RGB p. 27.
3Plantinga, “Is Belief in God Rational?” p. 27.
4RBG 47-63.
5Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1a pars, q. 84, a. 2; RBG 40f and 92 n. 28.
6RGB p. 59.
7Ibid., pp. 59-63.
8Ibid., p. 74.
9Ibid.
10Ibid., pp. 76-78.
11Plantinga, “Is Belief in God Properly Basic?”, p. 48.
12Ibid., p. 50.
13For a detailed discussion of two options, see Roderick Chisholm, The
Problem of the Criterion (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press), 1973.
14RBG p. 79.
15Ibid., p. 77.
16Ibid., p. 80.
17For a discussion of Plantinga’s notion of noetic structure, see RBG pp. 48-50; “A person’s noetic structure is the set of propositions he believes together with certain epistemic relations that hold among him and these propositions.” Plantinga analyzes the noetic structure from the point of view of foundationalism in general. There are three ways of classifying the contents of our noetic structure: (1) in terms of basicality; (2) in terms of degree of belief; and (3) in terms of the depth of ingress of a belief.
18RBG p. 79.
19Ibid., p. 81.
20Ibid.
21Plantinga makes a distinction between evidence and non-evidential ground. Evidence consists of beliefs on the basis of which other, non-basic beliefs are held, whereas grounds are not beliefs at all, but conditions or circumstances that occasion properly basic beliefs, and thereby justify them without being formulated as beliefs. To have evidence for a belief is to hold that belief on the basis of other beliefs which one consciously takes as supporting it. To have grounds for a belief, however, is to hold it in such way that there are conditions in which it arises and that justify it, even though the believer may typically be unaware at the moment of what those conditions are.
22RBG p. 78.