Metafisika Antitrinitarian ala Rudi: Iman Tanpa Entitas, Dogma Baru dalam Relasi Kosong

Dalam banyak video dan tanggapannya terhadap Patris Allegro, Rudi tampaknya menolak metafisika. Tapi siapa pun yang mempelajari sejarah pemikiran akan segera menyadari bahwa tidak ada teologi tanpa metafisika. Bahkan penolakan terhadap metafisika pun selalu didasarkan pada metafisika alternatif. Apa yang sebenarnya dianut Rudi?

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I. Penolakan terhadap Metafisika Substansial: Apa yang Ditinggalkan?

Metafisika tradisional Katolik, yang berpijak pada realisme thomistik, menyatakan bahwa realitas memiliki struktur objektif dan dapat dikenali secara analogis oleh akal manusia. Dalam kerangka ini:

• Allah adalah actus purus (wujud murni tanpa potensi, sempurna secara mutlak),

• Logos adalah pribadi kedua dari Tritunggal,

• Inkarnasi adalah kesatuan dua kodrat dalam satu pribadi (unio hypostatica),

• Keselamatan adalah tindakan objektif Allah yang mengambil natur manusia untuk menebusnya.

📖 “Deus est ipsum esse subsistens.”
(St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I q.3 a.4)

“Allah adalah keberadaan itu sendiri yang subsisten.”

Rudi dengan tegas menolak semua fondasi ini. Ia tidak sekadar menolak interpretasi, tapi menolak cara Gereja memahami realitas itu sendiri.

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II. Apa yang Diusung: Metafisika Relasional Simbolik

Secara eksplisit maupun implisit, Rudi mengadopsi pemikiran dari:

1. Hans-Georg Gadamer:
   ➤ Kebenaran tidak berdiri di luar bahasa; kebenaran terbentuk dalam dialog sejarah dan konteks.
   📖 “Being that can be understood is language.” (Truth and Method)

2. Paul Tillich:
   ➤ Allah bukan makhluk tertinggi, melainkan ground of being, dasar dari segala eksistensi.
   📖 “God does not exist. He is being-itself beyond essence and existence.”
   (Systematic Theology, Vol. 1)

3. John Shelby Spong:
   ➤ Yesus adalah manusia penuh kasih, bukan pribadi ilahi pra-eksisten.
   📖 “We have literalized myth, ontologized metaphor.”
   (Why Christianity Must Change or Die)

4. Marcus Borg:
   ➤ Firman bukan pribadi, melainkan cara simbolis untuk berbicara tentang kebijaksanaan Allah.
   📖 “We must learn to speak of Jesus metaphorically, not ontologically.”

Dari sinilah kerangka metafisik Rudi terbentuk. Ia menolak substansi dan menggantinya dengan simbol. Ia menolak keberadaan Allah sebagai pribadi, dan menggantinya dengan “relasi”, “kesadaran”, “hikmat”.

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III. Struktur Metafisik Rudi: Dikupas Sistematis

Aspek	Metafisika Katolik (Thomas)	Metafisika Rudi (Relasional-Simbolik)
Allah	Pribadi yang subsisten, sempurna, tak berubah	Energi cinta, dasar eksistensi, non-pribadi
Firman (Logos)	Pribadi kedua Trinitas, ilahi	Simbol hikmat, personifikasi moral
Inkarnasi	Unio hypostatika: dua kodrat, satu pribadi	Alegori etis tentang manusia sempurna
Keselamatan	Karya objektif Allah, penebusan dosa	Transformasi batiniah dan kesadaran moral
Wahyu	Komunikasi Allah dalam sejarah dan sakramen	Tafsir manusia dalam horizon budaya dan sejarah

 

📘 Apa Itu Metafisika? (Penjelasan untuk Awam)

Metafisika adalah cabang filsafat yang bertanya:
“Apa yang sungguh-sungguh ada?”
“Apa hakikat dari segala sesuatu?”

Kalau fisika mempelajari bagaimana dunia bekerja,
metafisika bertanya apa itu dunia.

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🔍 Contoh Sehari-hari:

• Kamu melihat pohon.
  Metafisika bertanya:
  ➤ Apa itu “pohon”? Apakah hanya kumpulan sel? Atau ada “hakikat ke-pohon-an”?

• Kamu bilang “kasih”.
  Metafisika bertanya:
  ➤ Apakah kasih itu nyata secara objektif? Atau cuma emosi yang berubah-ubah?

• Kamu percaya pada Tuhan.
  Metafisika bertanya:
  ➤ Siapa atau apa itu Tuhan? Apakah Dia ada sebagai pribadi nyata? Atau hanya simbol?

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🧠 Mengapa Metafisika Penting?

Karena semua kepercayaan berdiri di atas metafisika tertentu.
Tanpa sadar, ketika seseorang berkata:

“Yesus itu hanya manusia biasa.”
Itu metafisika.
Ia percaya bahwa realitas cuma dunia fisik dan manusia tidak bisa bersatu dengan yang Ilahi.

“Alkitab itu hanya tafsir sejarah.”
Itu metafisika.
Ia percaya bahwa tidak ada wahyu ilahi yang turun ke dalam dunia manusia.

“Allah itu relasi, bukan pribadi.”
Itu juga metafisika.
Ia mengubah ‘Allah sebagai Ada’ menjadi ‘Allah sebagai proses simbolik.’

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📐 Katolik dan Metafisika: Percaya pada Yang Nyata

Gereja Katolik memakai metafisika realis—khususnya dari St. Thomas Aquinas:

• Allah sungguh ada, bukan ide.

• Firman sungguh menjadi manusia dalam diri Yesus.

• Sakramen sungguh membawa rahmat, bukan simbol kosong.

• Surga, neraka, dan jiwa manusia adalah realitas, bukan sekadar cerita rohani.

📖 “Allah bukan sekadar ide tertinggi, tapi realitas yang berdiri di atas dan menopang semua yang ada.”
(St. Thomas Aquinas)

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❓ Kalau Kita Tidak Punya Metafisika, Apa yang Terjadi?

➡️ Kita akan berpindah ke metafisika lain, biasanya yang tak disadari:

• Metafisika modern: hanya yang bisa diukur itu nyata.

• Metafisika relativistik: semua tafsir sah, tak ada kebenaran objektif.

• Metafisika fungsionalis: iman hanya soal dampak sosial, bukan soal keselamatan abadi.

Dan inilah yang kita lihat dalam video-video seperti milik Rudi:

Ia menolak metafisika Katolik, tapi menggantinya dengan metafisika relasional-modern yang rapuh dan tanpa daya menyelamatkan.

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🏁 Kesimpulan:

Metafisika bukan hal sulit atau jauh. Itu adalah kerangka dasar cara kita memandang hidup, iman, dan Allah.

Tanpa metafisika yang benar,
iman akan jadi tafsir kosong,
Yesus jadi hanya guru moral,
dan keselamatan tinggal dongeng eksistensial.

📖 “Tanpa realitas yang berdiri teguh, iman tidak punya pijakan. Kita tidak diselamatkan oleh simbol, tapi oleh pribadi: Yesus Kristus, Firman yang menjadi daging.”

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Mengenal Tritunggal Mahakudus: Suatu Renungan Kateketik dalam Terang Santo Thomas Aquinas

 

"Tritunggal Mahakudus bukan sekadar dogma, melainkan misteri terdalam dari hidup batin Allah sendiri. Sebuah misteri yang hanya bisa kita ketahui karena Allah sendiri yang mewahyukannya kepada kita."

1. Tritunggal: Rahasia Ilahi yang Diwahyukan

Allah itu satu, namun tidak soliter. Ia adalah persekutuan kasih yang kekal: Bapa, Putra, dan Roh Kudus. Kita tidak akan sampai pada kebenaran ini hanya lewat akal budi. Kita mengetahuinya karena Deus loquitur — Allah berbicara! Ia mewahyukan diri-Nya, paling sempurna dalam pribadi Yesus Kristus.

Sebagaimana diungkapkan oleh Injil Yohanes:

“Pada mulanya adalah Sang Sabda, Sabda itu bersama-sama dengan Allah, dan Sabda itu adalah Allah” (Yoh 1:1)

Dengan menerima Yesus Kristus sebagai Sabda yang menjelma menjadi manusia, kita mengenal Allah sebagai Bapa yang mengutus, Sabda yang diutus, dan Roh Kudus yang mempersatukan.

2. Pemikiran Thomas Aquinas: Prosesio dan Relasi Ilahi

Santo Thomas Aquinas, dalam Summa Theologiae, memulai pembahasan Tritunggal dengan satu pertanyaan mendasar:
“Adakah procession dalam Allah?”
Pertanyaan ini bukan tentang prosesi liturgi, melainkan tentang prosesio aeternus—pengaliran pribadi secara kekal dalam hidup Allah sendiri.

• Putra berasal dari Bapa dalam cara yang disebut “generatio”—bukan secara jasmani, tapi secara intelektual: sebagai Sabda, sebagai Verbum aeternum, buah dari pengetahuan diri Allah.

• Roh Kudus berasal dari Bapa dan Putra dalam cara yang disebut “spiratio”—sebagai kasih yang timbul dari pengetahuan. Cinta tidak mendahului pengetahuan; kita mencintai karena kita terlebih dahulu mengenal.

Sebagaimana kata Yesus:

“Aku keluar dan datang dari Bapa” (Yoh 16:28)

3. Analoginya: Pengetahuan dan Kasih

Dalam diri kita, kita mengenal sesuatu melalui akal, dan dari pengenalan itu timbul cinta. Begitu pula dalam Allah—secara analogis:

• Putra adalah Pengetahuan Diri Allah—Sabda.

• Roh Kudus adalah Cinta antara Bapa dan Putra—Caritas subsistens.

Namun, berbeda dari kita, Sabda dan Kasih dalam Allah bukan hanya aktivitas, melainkan Pribadi Ilahi yang subsisten. Inilah mengapa kita berkata bahwa:

Putra adalah Allah dari Allah, Terang dari Terang, Allah sejati dari Allah sejati; dan Roh Kudus adalah Allah yang sama yang mengalir dari Bapa dan Putra.

4. Relasi Sejati dalam Allah

Karena adanya prosesio kekal ini, terdapat relasi sejati (relationes reales) dalam diri Allah:

• Bapa berelasi sebagai asal mula tanpa asal.

• Putra berelasi sebagai yang dilahirkan oleh Bapa.

• Roh Kudus berelasi sebagai yang dihembuskan oleh Bapa dan Putra.

Relasi-relasi ini bukanlah sekadar cara berbicara manusia, tetapi benar-benar menunjuk pada keberbedaan pribadi dalam keesaan hakikat Allah.

5. Kesatuan Hakikat: Homoousios

Ketiga pribadi ini bukan tiga Allah, melainkan satu Allah. Gereja menyebutnya dengan istilah Yunani: homoousios – sehakikat.

“Segala yang ada pada Bapa, dimiliki juga oleh Putra dan Roh Kudus. Keilahian tidak dibagi, tapi dibagikan sepenuhnya.”

Sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam pengakuan iman:

“Aku di dalam Bapa dan Bapa di dalam Aku” (Yoh 14:10)

6. Dari Misteri ke Relasi: Berdoa kepada Tritunggal

Kita bukan hanya memikirkan Tritunggal, tapi berelasi dengan-Nya.
Kita mengenal Bapa melalui Putra dalam Roh Kudus. Kita mencintai Putra dengan kasih yang diberikan oleh Roh Kudus. Kita berseru kepada Bapa karena Roh Kudus berseru dalam hati kita, Abba!

Refleksi teologis memperdalam relasi pribadi, dan relasi pribadi mendorong kita untuk semakin mencintai misteri Tritunggal. Iman yang dipahami, fides quaerens intellectum, akan memperkaya kasih dan penyembahan kita kepada Allah Tritunggal.

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Penutup: Tritunggal Bukan Masalah Logika, Tapi Rahasia Cinta

Tritunggal bukan paradoks yang harus dipecahkan, melainkan misteri kasih yang dihayati. Ia adalah Allah yang menyatakan Diri bukan sebagai kekuasaan tunggal yang dingin, tetapi sebagai communio personarum—persekutuan pribadi yang kekal.

Sebagaimana Roh Kudus mempersatukan Bapa dan Putra dalam kasih kekal, demikian pula Ia dikaruniakan kepada kita supaya kita boleh ambil bagian dalam hidup kasih Allah itu sendiri.

“Dalam nama Bapa, dan Putra, dan Roh Kudus.”

Bukan hanya rumusan baptisan, tapi juga undangan masuk dalam hidup Allah yang kekal.

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TUHAN BUKANLAH APA YANG KAMU PIKIRKAN

Mari kita jujur—mencoba untuk membayangkan Tuhan itu sangat sulit.

Makhluk yang cukup kuat untuk menciptakan alam semesta? Sesuatu yang ada di luar ruang dan waktu? Pikiran kita tidak dibangun untuk memahami sesuatu yang begitu luas. Kita bahkan tidak memiliki kata-kata yang tepat untuk itu. Namun, kita perlu memahaminya. Jadi apa yang harus kita lakukan?

Kami meraih apa saja yang akrab bagi kita.

Kita berkata, "Tuhan itu seperti manusia—tetapi, Anda tahu, sangat kuat. Dia kekal, jadi Dia pasti sudah tua. Tapi bijaksana—sangat bijaksana. Dan Dia ada di mana-mana, sepanjang waktu."

Upaya seperti ini dinamakan antropomorfisme—memberikan sifat-sifat manusia pada sesuatu yang non-manusiawi. Ini membantu kita mengambil konsep yang menakjubkan dan membuatnya terasa pribadi, mudah diakses, dan bahkan menghibur. Seorang sosok ayah, pelindung, hakim. Seseorang yang peduli. Seseorang yang meletakkan hukum moral. Seseorang yang berjuang untuk kita.

Itu masuk akal.

Tapi juga benar-benar salah.

Para filsuf telah menunjukkan hal ini selama berabad-abad. Ludwig Feuerbach mengatakannya terus terang: "Tuhan manusia adalah esensinya sendiri." Dengan kata lain, ketika kita membayangkan Tuhan, kita benar-benar hanya memproyeksikan diri kita kepada-Nya. Spinoza setuju, mengatakan orang melihat Tuhan dalam gambar mereka sendiri hanya karena mereka tidak tahu apa-apa lagi.

Bahkan Alkitab menolak gagasan ini. Yesaya 55:8 mengingatkan kita: "Sebab pikiran-Ku bukanlah pikiranmu, dan jalanmu bukanlah jalan-Ku, firman Tuhan." Jika Tuhan benar-benar melampaui batasan manusia, maka tidak ada gambaran manusia yang dapat melakukan yang seyogyanya kepada-Nya.

Thomas Aquinas juga memahami hal ini. Dia berpendapat bahwa ketika kita mengatakan hal-hal seperti "Tuhan itu bijaksana," kita tidak bisa memaksudkannya dengan cara kita memahami hikmat atau kebijaksanaan manusia. Hikmat Tuhan adalah sesuatu yang jauh melampaui kita, sesuatu yang tak terbatas. Faktanya, Aquinas percaya bahwa cara terbaik untuk menggambarkan Tuhan adalah dengan mengatakan apa yang bukan Dia daripada siapa Dia adanya.

Dan sejarah telah menunjukkan kepada kita bahaya melakukan kesalahan ini. Tuhan yang diciptakan menurut gambar kita mewarisi kekurangan kita. Sepanjang waktu, penggambaran antropomorfik tentang Tuhan telah digunakan untuk membenarkan perpecahan, perang, penindasan, dan kesukuan. Karl Barth mengatakannya dengan sederhana: "Jika Tuhan adalah manusia, kita tidak akan menyembah-Nya, tetapi mengasihani Dia."

Tetapi mungkin masalah terbesar dengan antropomorfisme adalah bahwa hal itu membatasi pengalaman kita tentang yang ilahi. Alih-alih bertemu dengan Tuhan sebagai sesuatu yang luas, misterius, dan di luar pemahaman, kita mengecilkan-Nya menjadi sesuatu yang akrab dan dapat dikelola.

Paul Tillich menawarkan cara berpikir yang berbeda. Dia menggambarkan Tuhan sebagai "dasar keberadaan"—bukan orang dengan sifat manusia, tetapi sumber keberadaan itu sendiri. Sesuatu yang lebih dalam, sesuatu yang tak terbatas, sesuatu yang memberi makna pada segalanya.

Jadi mungkin jawaban terbaik adalah jawaban yang diberikan Agustinus dari Hippo sejak lama:

"Jika Anda memahaminya, itu bukan Tuhan."

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Parthood, Trinitas dan Inkarnasi

Beberapa ahli teori melihat tiga pribadi Trinitas sebagai bagian dari Trinitas. Berikut ini adalah konsekuensi yang tidak diinginkan dari hal ini. Keterpisahan (parthood) bersifat transitif. Sepuluh jari adalah bagian dari Kristus. Kristus dalam pandangan tersebut adalah bagian dari Trinitas. Oleh karena itu, Trinitas memiliki sepuluh jari sebagai bagian. Yang tampaknya tidak masuk akal.

Tentu saja, orang mungkin khawatir tentang masalah yang sama untuk pandangan Trinitas yang lebih ortodoks. Sepuluh jari adalah bagian dari Kristus. Tetapi Kristus identik dengan Tuhan. Jadi sepuluh jari adalah bagian dari Tuhan. Namun, penganut Trinitas ortodoks terbiasa menjawab masalah dalam bentuk: "Kristus adalah A (misalnya, dapat berubah atau tidak mahatahu); Kristus identik dengan Tuhan; jadi Tuhan adalah A." ​​Dia mungkin menerima kesimpulan tersebut tetapi memblokir absurditas dengan gerakan qua: "Kristus qua (sebagai) manusia dapat berubah. Jadi Tuhan sebagai (qua) manusia, yaitu, pribadi ilahi yang adalah manusia, dapat berubah." Penganut Trinitas yang berketerpisahan (parthood-trinitarian) sebaiknya tidak mengatakan bahwa Trinitas memiliki sepuluh jari sebagai manusia, karena Trinitas bukanlah manusia. Mungkin dia dapat mengatakan bahwa Trinitas memiliki sepuluh jari sebagai keseluruhan yang memiliki bagian yang manusiawi. Namun, berdasarkan transitivitas dari bagian, makna qua tampaknya tidak banyak berpengaruh.

Langkah lain bagi penganut Trinitas yang lebih ortodoks adalah membedakan dua jenis identitas yang berbeda, identitas pribadi dan identitas hakikat, dan mengatakan bahwa beberapa predikat hanya ditransfer melalui salah satu dari dua identitas ini. Saya kira analogi untuk penganut Trinitas-bagian mungkin adalah membedakan dua jenis bagian dan mengatakan bahwa keduanya tidak dapat digabungkan berdasarkan transitivitas. Itu mungkin langkah terbaik bagi penganut Trinitas-bagian.

Akhirnya, penganut Trinitas yang lebih ortodoks dapat dengan mudah menyangkal adanya relasi seperti bagian—dan khususnya bahwa sepuluh jari adalah bagian dari Kristus.

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The First Truth as The Source of All Truths

Analysis of I Questio de Veritate of St Thomas Aquinas

To the question, “What is truth?” St. Thomas Aquinas gives a clear, concise, yet simple answer: truth is the expression of real correspondence between being as such and its conception in the intellect. It is perceived that the truth consists in the correspondence between the intellect and the existing thing. Thus, truth exists, properly, in the intellect and, improperly, in things. One thing is said to be "true" because its appearance naturally produces a correct understanding of what it is and is said to be "false" when the opposite occurs.

St Thomas distinguished truth in two senses: Ontological truth: It's the adaptation (adequatio) of the 'created being' to divine intellect, whereby it fulfills that for which it was ordained according to Divine Intellect. When this happens, we say that the created thing is true. The other truth is logical truth: It's the adaptation (adequatio) of human's intellect to the being of the created thing. In this relation, contrary to the ontological truth, no real relation is created when something is understood by a man, i.e. a dependence of the being on the man's understanding, but just a 'logical relation'/'relation of reason' is created. In fact it is human intellect which is dependent on the being of the thing, and not the other way around.

And in this sense Thomas affirms that all things are intelligible to the human intellect, since the reason for its intelligibility, as well as the inexhaustibility of its truth, is the fact of its being a creature. The fact that things are creatively thought of by God, according to Aquinas, grounds his intelligible being, as well as his inexhaustible being to the human intellect. Thus, by conceiving things as the thought of God, he infers that nothing is false, for God is conceived as the eternal truth, from which all truths have their foundation. Therefore, the truth, for St. Thomas, is as such independent of any human condition. Man may even cease to exist, but the truth will continue to exist, for its foundation is being in itself, understood as God, the foundation of all existence. Thus, truth understood as a formality does not run the risk of falling into relativism, the fruit of subjectivism - denying reality as the foundation of all human knowledge.

Truth is determined not only by an act of the intellect in agreement with the form of a being (the specific form), as Aristotle thought, or the act of inspecting some ideal exemplar as Plato thought, but rather, truth is the measure of a thing read by the intellect, and by this reading the intellect becomes perfected, and thereby measured.

Things are termed true because of their conformity with the divine intellect. And since being and knowing are identical in God, the beings He creates are known by Him and are thus true. The being and the truth of creatures are therefore convertible. Just as there is a hierarchy in being, there is also a hierarchy in truth.

The natural thing, the created being lies between two intellects, the divine intellect and the human intellect. The divine intellect is the first measure, because, in creating, it grants the mode of being, the measure, the thing. This, measured by the divine intellect, constitutes the second measure by measuring the human intellect. The human intellect is measured by natural things, and measuring only the artificial ones. From this, we can affirm that truth in man is not "less truth" than that of God. Truth is properly in the human intellect, as in the divine intellect. However, it is first in the divine intellect, whereas, in human intellect, secondarily.

If the created intellect did not exist, there would be no truth (in the intellect), but there would still be created truth. The truth of things would still conform to the divine intellect. However, if, the divine intellect did not exist, nor would the veritas rei exist, for there would not be an intellect to suit. In this way, the truth of being is assumed as measured (mensurata) by the divine intellect. On the other hand, it is capable of measuring (mensurans), of being intelligible, and of producing veritas intellectus in the human intellect.

As the highest being, absolute unity and the essence of all ideas, God himself is the supreme truth and truth in the full and proper sense. And just as the created things possess the divine being only as an image and divided into multiplicity, so too is the one divine truth in the individual things. All truth, both the truth of being (veritas rei) and the truth of the intellect (veritas intellectus), goes back to God as its ultimate source. And that any "adaequatio rei et intellectus" can come about is conditioned by the fact that both, things and the human intellect, are naturally attuned to each other as images of divine truth. Things are made to fit the cognition of the intellect; the intellect is created so that it can absorb the truth of things. The adaequatio rei et intellectus is thus ensured by a God-given "pre-established harmony" between things and the intellect.

Along with Thomas’ understanding of truth there appears a specific understanding of cognition. Cognition is first and foremost a perfection of a personal being. This is because the truth is not the result of cognition, but rather, cognition is the result of the truth “cognitio est quidam veritatis effectus”. If there were no truth in things, there would not be any cognition. Thomas also avoids any "reification of truth", which is treating truth like a being unto itself. He avoids also the instrumentalization of truth, that is, treating truth exclusively as a means of liberation, or the logicification of the truth, whereby truth would be treated merely as an effect of cognition. For this reason he specifically described truth as a measure, thanks to which the natural thing is measured and measuring (mensurata et mensurans). The truth that we know is the measure by which our intellect is measured and directed to the cognition of a being. The truth is then a consequence of the measure of a being’s existence. As St. Thomas says: Veritas sequitur esse rei. Thus the truth that is given to man is not merely derived from cognition or thought, as is commonly accepted today, but together with things it is given to man.

Finally, it must noted that the most important consequence of Thomas’ understanding of the truth is the discovery of the foundations for the intelligibility or rationality of the world. The world is like a book, but not like a blank notebook, in which each really existing thing bears within itself the thought and intention of the Creator, and perhaps that of a human artisan as well.

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A Summary of the Question II of DE MALO by Thomas Aquinas

First Article: Is an Act Involved in Every Sin?

There are two opinions about this matter. First, there is an act in every sin, even in sin of omission. And the second, there can be a sin even without an act of the will. And each opinion is true in some respect.

1. From the essence of sin

If we consider what is required for there to be sin, as belonging to the essence of sin, then an act is not required for a sin of omission; rather, the sin of omission consists of the very desistance from action. For example, if a doctor should administer medicine according to the rules of medical practice, and the sick person should fail to be cured, whether because the sick person has an incurable disease, or because the sick person does something adverse to the person's health, the doctor is indeed not at fault even though he fails to achieve the end. And conversely, if the doctor were to achieve the end but were to deviate from the rules of medical practice, we would nonetheless say that the doctor erred. And it is evident from this that it belongs more to the nature of fault to disregard a rule of action than even to fail to attain the end of the action. Therefore, it belongs intrinsically to the nature of fault, whether in nature or human skills or moral matters, to be contrary to a rule of action.

This rule of action includes particular negative and affirmative orders that are contained in the natural power of reason and in the divine law, which ought to govern our actions. And so as we impute acting as sin in that action is contrary to a negative order of the law, so also we impute non acting itself as sin in that non action is contrary to an affirmative order of the law.

Therefore, there can be a sin for which an act belonging to the essence of sin is not required. (The second opinion)

2. From the cause of sin

If we consider what is required for sin regarding the cause of sin, then an act needs to be required for any sin, even one of omission. There needs to be a cause for a person not doing what the person should do.

And if the cause was totally extrinsic, such an omission does not have the nature of sin. We only impute omission as sin when it has an intrinsic voluntary cause, not an intrinsic cause of any kind. For if an intrinsic involuntary cause, for example, fever, were to prevent a person from doing what the person should do, the argument would be the same as in the case of an extrinsic cause doing so. Therefore, for the omission of a duty to be a sin, it is required that a voluntary act cause the omission.

But the will indeed sometimes causes something intrinsically and sometimes accidentally. The will indeed causes intrinsically when it intentionally acts to produce such an effect (e.g., if one seeking to find treasure, should find some in the course of digging). The will causes accidentally when the effect is outside one's intention (e.g., if one wanting to dig a grave should find treasure). Therefore, a voluntary act is sometimes the intrinsic cause of omitting a duty but not in such a way that the will is directly borne to the omission. This is because nonbeing and evil are outside one's intention and one's power to will, and the object of the will is being and good. Rather, the will is indirectly borne to something positive when one foresees the resulting omission. For example, one wills to play games, knowing that doing so means not going to church, and we say that a thief, not shrinking from the deformity of injustice, wants money. And a voluntary act is sometimes the accidental cause of omitting a duty, as when a person occupied in some activity does not recall something that the person is obliged to do. And it makes no difference in this regard whether the voluntary act that intrinsically or accidentally causes the omission is simultaneous with the omission itself or even precedes it. Therefore, the first opinion is true in this respect, that a voluntary act needs to cause the omission of a duty for the omission to be sinful.

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Aristotelian Conception of Soul

To ask what a human being is is to ask what the nature of a human being is. What makes human beings the kinds of things they are? What makes them distinctive? What sets them apart from other kinds of thing?

Generally, people fall into one of the following three “camps” on the question of the soul (by soul, I mean the immaterial aspect of the human being which thinks, feels, and wills), namely:

1) Materialistic Monists – A person is their body; the soul is reducible to the material or simply doesn’t exist.

2) Descartesian Dualists – A person is their soul; the soul is a separable, non-material substance that inhabits the body.

3) Aristotelian Animalists – A person is their body and their soul; the soul is the non-material form of the body, unified with the body.

In this paper, I will show that the third position, which avoids the pitfalls of both materialism and dualism, the Aristotelian Animalists, is that of the most plausible.

Soul as Form of the Body

Aristotle wrote in De Anima that the soul is: “(a) the source or origin of movement, it is (b) the end, it is (c) the essence of the whole living body.” For Aristotle, there are different kinds of souls (plant, animal, and human) with varying degrees of biological and cognitive activity. The human soul is the animating form of the matter of the human animal, the actuating “breath” of what a body is and does. Aristotle thus distinguishes the soul from the material body, but not as a ghost from a machine. Unlike Plato, Aristotle concluded that the soul is “inseparable from its body,” although the highest faculty of the soul—the mind—is “immortal and eternal.”

According to Aristotle a living creature is ‘substance’. It contains Body = matter, and Soul = form. The soul (psyche) is the structure of the body - its function and organization. This was the word Greeks gave to the animator, the living force in a living being. For Aristotle the psyche controlled reproduction, movement and perception.

In contrast Aristotle regarded reason (nous) as the highest form of rationality. He believed that the ‘unmoved mover’ of the universe was a cosmic nous.

Aristotle thought that the soul is the Form of the body. The soul is simply the sum total of the operations of a human being.

The Stagyrite believed that there exists a hierarchy of living things – plants only have a vegetative soul, animals are above plants because they have appetites, humans are above animals because it has the power of reason.

Distinction between Body and Soul

Aristotle tries to explain his understanding of the distinction between the body and the soul using the analogy of an axe. If an axe were a living thing then its body would be made of wood and metal. However, its soul would be the thing which made it an axe i.e. its capacity to chop. If it lost its ability to chop it would cease to be an axe – it would simply be wood and metal.

Another illustration he uses is the eye. If the eye were an animal, sight would have to be its soul. When the eye no longer sees then it is an eye in name only.

Likewise, a dead animal is only an animal in name only – it has the same body but it has lost its soul.

What is important for Aristotle is the end purpose of something – an axe chops, an eye sees, an animal is animated…etc. This is what is meant by ‘teleology’ from the Greek teleo meaning end.

For Aristotle, the body and soul are not two separate elements but are one thing. The body and the soul are not, as Plato would have it, two distinct entities, but are different parts or aspects of the same thing.

The Problem: Mortal or Immortal

Aristotle does not allow for the possibility of the immortality of the soul. The soul is simply the Form of the body, and is not capable of existing without the body. The soul is that which makes a person a person rather than just a lump of meat! Without the body the soul cannot exist. The soul dies along with the body.

Aristotle appears to make one exception – reason (nous). However, he is not clear about how this reason survives death or whether or not it is personal.


Conclusion

For Aristotle there is no clear evidence such as Plato's Realm. Instead he appeals to our senses, claiming that it through them that we experience reality. However, we are still left with the problem that there is no clear evidence that our senses are reliable. A religious person might argue that we know the world through faith and revelation.

Aristotle does not adequately explain how God as a thinking force could be responsible for causing movement. On the one hand he stresses that real knowledge beings with the senses but the concept of something being moved just through thought is not what most of us experience.

Aristotle's earthy notion of the soul was picked up by scholastic philosophers, most notably Thomas Aquinas. In his Summa Theologica, Aquinas agreed with Aristotle that “it belongs to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body,” and that although a human soul’s rationality points to its subsistence after death, the disembodied soul is a form without matter, and therefore incomplete. Death does not result in the final liberation and fulfillment of the soul, but a dislodging of the body’s essence, our being “not wholly at rest.”

The position of the Aristotelian Animalists seems to be the most coherent and plausible than the others: Materialistic Monists and Cartesian Dualists, since it leaves us with the fewest problems and has the most explanatory power.


Readings:
1. Lectures on Philosophical Theories of Person, Manuscript
2. The Human Soul as an Individual Substance: Plato and Aristotle, http://inters.org/soul

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