Biblical Topoi in Mad Max: Furry Road Sacrifice, Hope and Perseverance

Mad Max: Fury Road (2015) is the fourth Mad Max film, and is directed by George Miller. This film, like the other three ones explores themes of societal decay and the heroism of everyday people in a violent world. There are lots of action scenes with big explosions and lots of crashes. But it also demonstrates that action films can have substance. It takes the genre of action film to a different level, adding complex themes of justice and redemption.

Watching this film I found many religious imageries: Hope, Redemption, Brokenness, Fall, Blood, Life, Death, Curse, Witness, Prayer, Self Sacrifice.

In this paper I will consider some imageries of the film. I shall begin with the film’s plot, then I’ll consider the imageries. I choose some clips to show their relation to the biblical topoi (and Christian theology) as Living Water, Sacrifice, Hope and Perseverance, and Triumph over Satan. The videoclips must be understood and interpreted in the whole scene of the film.

I, then, conclude that this film is another beautiful way of telling the Exodus of the Bible.

1. The Plot

Planet Earth has been turned into an arid, sun-baked wasteland in a future time. Civilization as we know it has collapsed and in its place, there just a subhuman race. This one is located in Australia and Max has been taken prisoner by the War Boys, the hordes controlled by the evil warlord, King Immortan Joe. Max is special as he has been marked as a universal blood donor, and is therefore used by Immortan as a blood bag for the sick War Boy Nux.

In another scene, Furiosa steers drives her heavily-armed and armored truck called a War Rig to deliver some supplies. Suddenly and without warning, Furiosa steers the vehicle off the designated route. Joe find out that his Five Wives — genetically pure women who are selected for bearing his children — are not in the prison he keeps them locked in. Angered, Joe takes out his entire War Boy army to get Furiosa, enlisting the help of forces from Gas Town and the Bullet Farm - two areas that are close by.

Nux has a moment of realization when one of the Five Wives tells him that he is just a pawn in an old man's army. He later falls for one of the Five Wives and then joins forces with Max and Furiosa. In the ensuing battle between Furiosa and Joe's army, Furiosa boldly makes for a terrible sandstorm, which allows her to evade Joe for the time being. But Nux who tries to sacrifice himself in a blaze of glory to stop Furiosa, remains chained to Max. Max escapes and neutralizes Nux. Max staggers towards Furiosa and sees her doing maintenance on her Rig, and the Wives, who are outside and washing the dust and grime off themselves. Max commandeers the Rig, but its pre-programmed kill-switch disables the truck after barely a mile or so. Max then has to choice but to agree to allow Furiosa and the Wives accompany him, while Nux who has been abandoned, staggers back to Immortan.

Furiosa then powers her War Rig right through the Biker gang stronghold and gets inside a small canyon. She has made a deal with them to allow her to go in return for supplying them with thousands of gallons of fuel. However, Joe's forces are in hot pursuit and Furiosa escapes even as the Bikers detonate the nearby canyon walls to block Joe's path with rubble. Max and Furiosa fend off the pursuing Bikers but Joe's vehicle evades the blockade and assaults the Rig.

Nux boards the Rig while Joe attempts to shoot Furiosa. The Splendid Angharad, who Joe has made pregnant, shields Furiosa, but falls from the Rig and is run over by Joe's car, killing her and his child in the process. Furiosa explains to Max that they are escaping to the Green Place, a location she remembers from when she was a child. Capable, one of the Five Wives, finds Nux, distraught that he contributed to the death of Joe's pregnant wife; she consoles him. At night, the heavy Rig gets caught in deep mud. Furiosa and Max slow Joe's forces with explosives, but Joe's ally, the Bullet Farmer, pursues the Rig. Nux helps free the Rig while Furiosa shoots and blinds the Bullet Farmer. He retaliates with machine gun fire and explosives. Max wanders into the dark to confront the Bullet Farmer, returning to the Rig with guns and ammunition.

As dawn breaks, the Rig travels through swampland and desert, eventually coming across a naked woman. Max identifies it as a trap, but Furiosa leaves the Rig and states her former clan affiliation. The woman summons her group who realize that Furiosa is a member of their clan, kidnapped with her mother when she was a child. Furiosa is distraught to learn that the swamp land they passed was the Green Place, which is now uninhabitable. The clan, Furiosa, the Wives, and Nux agree to take their bikes and set out across the immense salt flats in the hope of finding somewhere new to live. Max chooses to stay behind, but after seeing visions of his dead daughter, he convinces them to return to the Citadel, which has ample water and greenery that Joe keeps for himself, and trap Joe and his army in the Biker's canyon.

The group begins the journey back to the Citadel, eventually encountering Joe. A battle is waged by the two sides, and Furiosa is gravely wounded. Joe positions his car in front of the Rig to slow it, while Max fights Joe's son Rictus. Toast the Knowing is captured and put on Joe's car, but she distracts him, allowing Furiosa to hook Joe's mask to his car's rotating wheels, tearing his face off and killing him. Nux sacrifices himself by destroying the Rig, blocking the canyon, killing Rictus, and allowing Max, Furiosa, and the Wives to escape in Joe's car. Max gives his blood to Furiosa, to help her survive her injuries.

At the Citadel, Joe's citizens are overjoyed at the sight of Joe's corpse. Furiosa and the Wives are raised up on a lift by the child War Boys. As Furiosa looks back, she realizes that Max has stayed behind and is moving away through the crowd. They then look at each other, and bid each other farewell, knowing perhaps, that their paths will cross again.

2. Imageries Considerations

2.1 Immortan Joe: Lucifer and The Living Water

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aBD30p1tUgg

Immortan Joe, fits the profile of Lucifer (Satan) in the Bible. If there’s one thing that Satan always tries to do as depicted in the Bible it’s blocking access to true life and giving people a pale imitation of God’s perfection.

Immortan Joe controls the only source of clean water in the Wasteland. He has access to a pump system that draws massive volumes of water from aquifers deep beneath the earth. It’s essentially a gargantuan well.

In the Bible, those who dug wells and controlled the water became the owners of the land. In Biblical times, wells were deeds to the land. Whoever controlled the wells controlled everything. Jehovah is described as the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. All three men as shown in Genesis 26 were well-diggers.

Jesus, in John 4, spoke of a spiritual well and used Jacob’s well as symbolism for “living water,” which, according to Jesus, is the only place where we can find true life that will last into eternity, and also according to Jesus this living water can only be found in Him. But, unlike Satan (and any religious or non-religious leader controlled by Satan), Jesus pours out His living water freely without limit to anyone who believes in Him and asks for that water.

In the Bible, we see Satan over and over again finding ways to stop people from gaining access to God’s spiritual well of living water. Through idolatry, greed, fear anything he could find Satan trapped and enslaved people into depending on him for spiritual water and cutting people off from ever finding the true water of God.

Immortan Joe does the same thing. He keeps all of society enslaved to him, and he only gives them little tastes of water never the whole volume of it, and never enough to bring any real health or freedom. He even creates a false religion around his persona. He lifts himself up as “their redeemer” and struts around as a messiah. But he is a false messiah who is unwilling to back up his grand promises of Valhalla, and in truth he despises the people.

That’s exactly how Lucifer is depicted in the Bible. His main interest is gaining as much power over humans as he can, and then establishing himself as a messiah, a false god worthy of worship — all the while enslaving and destroying those who worship him.

So, from that angle, “Fury Road” presents an archetype who closely resembles the traits of Lucifer in the Bible.

2.2 Nux and The War Boys: Sacrifice

“My world is fire and blood,” says Max in his opening monologue, and there’s plenty of fire and blood to go around. The blood comes in the form of the unpleasant sacrifices we see people having to make in order to survive. Both the fire and the blood compose the fuel that propagates the modus operandi of this society: be good so that you can go to Valhalla.

Videoclips:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7mTzUT7XkKE

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y4cafPOBubc

For the War Boys – the militant arm of the Citadel – being good enough to go to Valhalla means being “kamakrazee” enough to give up one’s own life for that of Immortan Joe, the commander-in-chief himself. And while most War Boys answer their call without a hitch, one War Boy named Nux can’t seem to get it right.

His first attempt involves flooding his car with guzzoline (gasoline), cutting in front of the hijacked War Rig, lighting a road flare, and then putting the flame to the pool of guzzoline. This would cause his pursuit vehicle to explode, and that explosion would stop the War Rig. Mad Max, however, is able to stop Nux from touching the flame to the guzzoline, and Nux’s efforts are wasted.

Nux gets a chance to redeem himself to Immortan Joe when he offers to climb aboard the War Rig again and pike Furiosa – the one who commandeered the War Rig – in the spine. Immortan Joe personally blesses the mission by handing Nux a piston along with the permission to shoot Furiosa in the skull. Upon completion, Immortan Joe promises to carry Nux himself to the glorious gates of Valhalla. Clumsy Nux messes up once again and then is abandoned by Immortan Joe because of that failure.
This is the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mhm-4kDBhio

The key to understanding these botched sacrifices is in understanding that they were ignoble and selfish and thus overall detestable. Nux wasn’t even really sacrificing himself for anyone but himself, no matter what pretentious pomp and circumstance he surrounded the attempts with. On top of that, his sacrifices, had they worked, would have meant the death of innocent people for no reason but his own comfort and glorification.

These kinds of sacrifices are what the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob hates. As he tells the Israelite people through his prophet Malachi, he wishes someone would close the temple doors because those sacrifice stink so badly. He doesn’t want pretentious and selfish religiosity but actual care for those who cannot take care of themselves; such was the example he set for us by exacting the judgment we deserve on his own Son on our behalf so that we could live a life filled with love like He wants us to.

Videoclip of Nux’ True Sacrifice: https://youtu.be/blDjU-W95II

However, time passed and Nux has learn enough from his experience. In a scene he sacrifices himself, but not for Immortan Joe. He sacrifice himself for the “good men” team, on their way back to Citadel.

2.3 Furiosa and the Team: Hope and Perseverance

Videoclip https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6QOcaW1M3JM

Once again, this is a desert wasteland, and resources for survival are few and far between. The most valuable resource, water, is being controlled by the Immortan Joe, who will only pump it out whenever he sees fit. This wouldn’t be a problem if he didn’t degrade water as “addictive” and blame it for society’s troubles like he does. His people hunger and thirst while he waters his own plants on a continual basis.

That’s why Joe’s concubines, his imprisoned “Breeders,” have sought out the aid of the Imperator Furiosa to take them to a better life. They’ve all heard of the Green Place; Furiosa was even born there. No doubt she has told them all stories of that beautiful location and thus created a longing within them so strong to make them want to beseech Furiosa’s help in this mission.

It isn’t just about the Green Place for Furiosa, though, or anyone else for that matter. The concubines, Furiosa, Nux, and Max are all longing for something better than their present state. The “promise” of Valhalla falls short to the hope these characters have in a place that can help them live a better life.

But after they discover that the Green Place no longer exists, the convoy realizes that their best option now is to overthrow the Citadel and liberate the resources that Immortan Joe has been hoarding for himself. The plan is even feasible because the Citadel is unprotected; any armed services are still out in the desert with Immortan Joe. The mission then becomes to reach the Citadel before the other team, and the winner will take all.

Videoclip: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HClM8YvNljo

Coming back to Citadel, is not without hindrance and challenge. They have to fight heavily on the way back. But there is still hope, and perseverance of the team. The good guys of Mad Max Fury Road to be like the faithful remnant of the Israelite people as described in the Old Testament. When the rest of Israel fell away to other gods and pagan practices, a small group – the faithful remnant – stayed vigilant and longed for the home from which they had been evicted. They hoped to return one day, but they knew that God had to go before them and clear the way in order for them to enter into.

This is the example of the faithful remnants of both the Israelites and Furiosa’s team: stay faithful, stay hopeful, and remain vigilant in our faith. Keyword: persevere. Because when that for which we have longed comes to pass – you know, like being back home with God – it will be a dream fulfilled.

2.4 The Final Scene: Triumph over Satan

Videoclip: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9UzaRsCrNDY

The film was ended by the triumphal coming of the Team to Citadel. The scene depict the dead of Immortan Joe, and the people screaming of joy. They are freed from the slavery of Immortan Joe. It closely resembles the triumph of Jesus over Satan.

The scene which Mad Max stand over the dead body of Immortan Joe reminds us of the Ressurection of Jesus on the third day, when Satan lost his power over mankind. And man will participate in the live of Jesus the Redemptor.

3. Conclusion

One can say that the whole movie can be interpretated in several ways. But we can say that this is the movie about The Exodus in the Bible. First the Exodus of Israel as an archetype for the exodus of every human being from the slavery of this world and Satan as the King of this world. It is a journey toward the Promise Land, the Paradise, which is a journey full of challenge. And only hope, perseverance and sacrifice, one can go into the Paradise, the promise land, that is living happily in the source of the Living Water: God the Holy Trinity.

Read More

Is Believe in God Properly Basic?

Introduction

In this paper I shall concern myself with the question of whether theistic belief could be rational without propositional evidence or any support by argument. In a series of articles Plantinga juxtaposes what he calls ‘Reformed epistemology’ (or Calvinist epistemology) with ‘classical foundationalism’ (which he finds in Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Hume, and many others) and concludes that the theist is rationally justified in believing in God without much further evidence. 1 Plantinga’s method is first to criticize classical foundationalism. After showing its inadequacy, he then identifies certain immediate non-inferential beliefs which most persons would agree are reasonable to hold, such as “I see a tree”, “I ate breakfast this morning”, or “that person is in pain.”

Having established the reasonableness of such beliefs, he claims that religious beliefs are analogous to such commonly held nontheistic beliefs.

What I would examine carefully is his claim that belief in God is properly basic within some non-classical version of foundationalism. First, the basic theory of Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology shall be laid out. Then, I shall argue that Plantinga’s position is untenable since the method given by his account for demarcating proper and improper basic beliefs raises some difficulties.

2. Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology

2.1 The Evidentialist Objection

Plantinga’s reformed epistemology is intended to rebut what he calls ‘the evidentialist objection’ to theistic belief. At issue in the debate between Plantinga and evidentialists is the question of what kinds of beliefs can be properly basic. According to this objection, made by W. K. Clifford and developed by contemporary antitheologians like Michael Scriven and Brand Blanshard, theistic belief is ‘irrational or unreasonable or not rationally acceptable or intellectually irresponsible or noetically substandard’ 2 unless there are sufficient reasons for it.3 Thus the evidentialist denies that belief in God, in Plantinga’s terms, is ‘properly basic’. If the belief that God exists is properly basic, then, of course, the evidentialist objection fails.

For the objection assumes that this belief is one which should be accepted only on the basis of, and in proportion to the strength of, the relevant evidence. And, if properly basic, the belief that God exists is not of that kind, but is such that accepting it without evidence is epistemologically proper.

Plantinga traces evidentialism to the epistemological theory which he calls ‘classical foundationalism’.4 The general theory of foundationalism is that beliefs are justified in one of two ways: They are either based on other justified beliefs, or are justified without such dependence (or, to use Plantinga’s term of choice, properly basic). These properly basic beliefs are generally understood to derive their justification from the circumstances or experiences that give rise to them, rather than from any doxastic phenomenon. These beliefs provide foundation from which all other justified beliefs are justified. A belief is justified, then, only if it is properly basic or can trace its support to one or more properly basic beliefs.

Plantinga identifies two epistemological strains that unite in classical foundationalism. First, there is ancient and medieval foundationalism, epitomized in Aquinas, in which beliefs are properly basic just in case they are self-evident or evident to the senses. A self-evident belief is of a proposition that is ‘perceived immediately by the mind’, such as “2 + 2 = 4”, “all bachelors are unmarried males”, and “the whole is equal to the sum of its parts” - one known ‘through itself (per se nota)’. 5 These propositions are like the simple truths of logic and arithmetic - those that present themselves to us as obviously true, so that their denial would force us immediately into some absurdity. Beliefs that are evident to the senses are reports of immediate experience - such as “there is a piece of paper before me”, “there is a tree before me”, and “the wall that I am looking at is yellow”. The second strain is modern foundationalism, which maintains that beliefs can be properly basic just in case they are self-evident or incorrigible. Incorrigible propositions are those about one’s states of consciousness in which one cannot mistakenly believe what is not true, such as “I seem to see a red ball” or “I think, therefore, I am”, or “I am in pain”. To sum up, the classical foundationalist’s principle may be defined as follows:

(1) A proposition p is properly basic for a person S if and only if p is either self-evident to S or incorrigible for S or evident to the senses for S . 6

The argument from (1) to evidentialism is clear. Beliefs are justified without evidence (properly basic) only if they are self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses. Hence, no theistic belief is properly basic.

So, to the question of what is wrong with theistic belief so that it is not properly basic, the foundationalist replies that it is non-self-evident, corrigible, non-perceptual belief, and no such belief is properly basic.

It seems to be Plantinga’s contention that classical foundationalism is one of the strongest motivations for evidentialism. So Plantinga argues against classical foundationalism, and thus seeks to undercut the evidentialist objection to the Reformed epistemology.

Plantinga levels two charges against classical foundationalism. First, he notes that (1) would deny properly basic status to many beliefs that it seems quite natural to regard as properly basic. Plantinga has in mind perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs, and beliefs about other minds. For instance, my belief that I had lunch a few hours ago seems to be properly basic even though it is not self-evident, not evident to the senses, or not incorrigible. These follow neither deductively, inductively, nor on a probabilistic basis from the basic beliefs allowed by (1). This shows that (1) is false or at least unjustified, since surely many beliefs about other minds and the past are justified.

Second and more important, Plantinga argues that the classical foundationalism is self-referentially incoherent - it cannot account for its own justified acceptance.7 In order for S to be justified in accepting classical foundationalism, Plantinga notes, (1) must be either properly basic for S or derivable from that which is properly basic for S. No classical foundationalist has ever argued for (1) from propositions that meet its own criteria for proper basicality. But it seems that (1) is neither self-evident, nor incorrigible, nor evident to the sense. If (1) is properly basic, it is false - since it claims that no propositions of that sort is properly basic. So, Plantinga concludes, either (1) is false, or it cannot be justifiably believed. The upshot of this criticism is both to show the inadequacy of the classical foundationalist’s criteria of proper basicality and to claim that there are no good reasons to suppose belief in God cannot itself be accepted as properly basic.

2.2 The Great Pumpkin Objection

To say that belief in God does not have to conform to foundationalist criteria is not to say that it stands without need of justification. Plantinga is aware that an apparent difficulty arises here. If God’s existence can be rationally accepted even though it is supported by no argument or evidence, why couldn’t just about any belief be accepted in the same way? Why couldn’t astrology, say, or voodoo be accepted as properly basic beliefs? 8

The elimination of foundationalism may have got rid of unduly harsh restrictions on proper basicality, but now it looks like we might have the opposite problem. Hasn’t Plantinga thrown open the floodgates to superstition and irrationality? 9 If we eliminate the foundationalist criteria for proper basicality but have no new standards to put in their place, what is to prevent anyone from claiming just about any sort of belief as properly basic?

Plantinga calls this the ‘Great Pumpkin’ objection because it charges that Reformed epistemology would license nearly any sort of belief as properly basic, even the belief that the Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween. Far from allowing any and every belief to count as properly basic, Plantinga replies, Calvinistic epistemology recognizes that beliefs can be properly basic in some circumstances but not in others. 10 In other words, properly basic beliefs are those which arise out of appropriate corresponding circumstances. Improper basic beliefs lack the appropriating grounding experiences. So, to take the belief in the Great Pumpkin, we see that there is obviously no corresponding experience which serves as its grounds.

Why, Plantinga asks, would anyone think that such claims commit Reformed epistemologists to the view that anything goes? Perhaps underlying that charge is the recognition that Plantinga has eliminated the foundationalist criteria for proper basicality but has offered no better criteria to take their place. Plantinga replies that some judgments about proper basicality are possible even in the absence of precise, well-defined criteria. Consider an analogy: Surely “the slithy toves did gyre and gymble in the wabe” can be judged meaningless even if we do not possess absolutely general criteria that would unambiguously settle every question about meaning. 11 Likewise, Plantinga holds, certain beliefs can be judged properly basic and others not even in the absence of criteria to judge justifiably that “1 + 1 = 2” is properly basic but that “The Great Pumpkin will return next Halloween” is not.

Here, it should be noted that, when Plantinga criticizes strong foundationalism, he is not rejecting foundationalism as such. He still accepts the foundationalist’s distinction between basic and derived beliefs, as well as the assumption that there must be properly basic beliefs from which all of our other beliefs have to be derived if they are to be rationally justified. What he rejects is merely the classical foundationalist’s overly restrictive criterion for what can qualify as properly basic beliefs.

How, then, should one decide what beliefs can be properly basic? Or, how, then, should one approach the problem of the criteria for proper basicality? Here, Plantinga does not offer any criteria for proper basicality, but he does suggest that the manner of arriving at such will be broadly inductive.

The proper way to arrive at such a criterion is, broadly speaking, inductive. We must assemble examples of beliefs and conditions such that the former are obviously properly basic in the latter, and examples of beliefs and conditions such that the former are not properly basic in the latter. We must then frame hypotheses as to the necessary and sufficient conditions of proper basicality and test these hypotheses by reference to those examples. 12

Plantinga, following Chisholm, pursues the option of ‘particularism’ rather than ‘methodism’. 13 Stated simply, the particularist holds that one develops a criterion, say for proper basicality, by comparing it to examples one already considers properly basic. The criteria are subsequent to our already having gathered examples of properly basic beliefs. One then tests the adequacy of the criteria by reference to those examples. Why, then, says Plantinga, cannot our criteria be developed so as to include belief in God?

More importantly, one should notice that although belief in God is basic, (it does not rest on other beliefs adduced as evidence for it), it is not ‘groundless’. For any belief q,...qn there is a corresponding set of circumstances that spontaneously and non-inferentially gives rise to my belief and justifies me in my taking it as basic. For example, consider the belief, “I see a cat on the mat.” Typically I do not hold such a belief on the basis of other beliefs; it is basic for me. But this belief is not groundless - it corresponds to an appropriate set of circumstances, namely, the experiences consisting of my being appeared to in an appropriate way; in this case ‘catly’ and ‘matly’. Plantinga says, My being appeared to in this characteristic way (together with other circumstances) is what confers on me the right to hold the belief in question; this is what justifies me in accepting it. We could say, if we wish, that this experience is what justified me in holding it; this is the ground of my justification, and by extension, the ground of the belief itself. 14

How, then, can theists be sure of having criteria that permit them to regard belief in God as properly basic? Simply by making belief in God one of their examples of obvious proper basicality. 15 In other words, since our criteria in large part will derive from what we initially take as obviously properly basic, those criteria will naturally permit the taking of such beliefs as properly basic.

What, then, are the circumstances in which Plantinga regards belief in God as obviously properly basic? He gives a number of such circumstances.

Upon reading the Bible, one may be impressed with a deep sense that God is speaking to him. Upon having done what I know cheap, or wrong, or wicked, I may feel guilty in God’s sight and form the belief God disapproves of what I have done. Upon confession and repentance I may feel forgiven, forming the belief God forgives me for what I have done. A person in grave danger may turn to God asking for his protection and help; and of course he or she then has the belief that God is indeed able to hear and help if He sees fit. When life is sweet and satisfying, a spontaneous sense of gratitude may well up within the soul; someone in this condition may thank and praise the Lord for his goodness, and will of course have the accompanying belief that indeed the Lord is to be thanked and praised. 16

Plantinga claims that belief in God is properly grounded in other beliefs, such as “God is speaking to me” and “God forgives me”, which are properly basic. They are analogous to perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs, and beliefs about other minds. In proper circumstances (e.g., where there is no reason to believe that my noetic structure 17 is defective), my having an experience of a certain sort confers on me the right to hold the belief in question.18 In like manner, having religious experiences is properly basic in the right circumstances. In this sense, strictly speaking, it is not belief in God that is properly basic for Plantinga, but rather beliefs such as the belief that God is speaking to me, that God forgives me, that God has created all this, and that God is to be thanked and praised. 19 However, since beliefs of this sort self-evidently entail that God exists, Plantinga believes that there is no harm in speaking a bit loosely and talking as if the relatively abstract, high-level proposition “God exists” is itself properly basic. 20

Critical Considerations

According to Plantinga, there are many kinds of beliefs which can function as properly basic. As such they need not be based on the evidence of other propositions. These properly basic beliefs are grounded, and hence justified not by other propositions which serve as evidence but experience of a certain kind. 21 Examples of the kinds of belief which can be properly basic are perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs, beliefs about other minds. The classical foundationalist’s criteria are defective because of self-referentially inconsistent or questioning-begging evidentialist presuppositions about what can count as a basic belief.

But to say that classical foundationalism fails in its task, and theistic beliefs do not have to conform to foundationalist criteria is not to say that belief in God is properly basic. Plantinga’s strategy is based on the argument that some beliefs about God’s action and attributes can function as properly basic beliefs, and since these beliefs entails God’s existence, theism is thereby justified.

Let us return to the ‘Great Pumpkin’ objection. Plantinga’s reply was, first, that not all judgments about proper basicality need be grounded in criteria, and second, that Reformed epistemology allows for the inductive formulation of such criteria. These replies certainly show that Plantinga himself is not required to accept, say, astrology or voodoo as properly basic. But is this the core of problem? Is the important question whether or not Reformed epistemology allows Plantinga to hold these things as properly basic? The crucial issue is whether Reformed epistemology provides any grounds for denying that others have the right to make such claims. One problem with Plantinga’s account is that the precise relationship between the grounds for our belief and the belief itself is not adequately specified.

Plantinga makes it clear that not just any belief can be properly basic but that a properly basic belief is not groundless although lacking discursive evidence. Thus, some beliefs are not properly basic because they lack grounding.
Furthermore, Plantinga claims that arriving at the criterion for proper basicality leads to identifying belief in the Great Pumpkin as irrational. But why should the Great Pumpkinite accept this? Admittedly, belief in the Great Pumpkin is not something I take to be rational, but what if we come upon some tribe that believes it is? Suppose this tribe has read Plantinga, followed his inductive procedure, and takes Great Pumpkin belief as properly basic. Suppose they even specify their criterion for proper basicality and it does not lead to any incoherence. What is Plantinga to say?

Plantinga’s reply is that we do not have any natural inclination to believe in the Great Pumpkin, whereas we do have a natural inclination to believe in God. 22 Nevertheless, Plantinga would admit the rationality of Great Pumpkin belief insofar as such belief actually resembles theistic belief.

How would it be possible, once the inductive procedure is completed, for Great Pumpkin belief to be rejected as irrational? First, if no one ever has Great Pumpkin experiences and simply chooses arbitrarily to believe in the Great Pumpkin, no such belief is rational. It is not grounded. Second, if one does have Great Pumpkin experiences to ground such belief and Plantinga still rejects the belief as irrational, he must mean that no Great Pumpkinite’s Great Pumpkin belief is irrational. At this point, he must have some independent reason for rejecting Great Pumpkin belief. He seems to think that if one inductively arrives at the criterion for proper basicality and the criterion rules out Great Pumpkin belief, then no one’s evidentially unsupported belief in the Great Pumpkin could be rational. But pace Plantinga, what if the Great Pumpkin takes his belief to be properly basic and thus arrives at a different criterion? Plantinga’s response is inconsistent with his inductive procedure and its potential results. To be consistent, he must allow for such a potentiality.

To sum up, Plantinga does not give any criteria to help us distinguish in advance of his inductive procedure unacceptable from acceptable candidates for proper basicality, but merely suggests that the manner of arriving at such will be broadly inductive. Plantinga’s point is that it is not his concern to make judgments about other people’s rationality.

Perhaps his only concern is to show that the fact that someone accepts the existence of God as properly basic doesn’t mean that that person is thereby committed to accepting practically any belief as properly basic. Maybe we can speak for ourselves, but we cannot impose standards of proper basicality on others. Consequently, it leads Plantinga to claim that there is a certain relativity in the process of searching for criteria for proper basicality.

Since different people regard different beliefs as non-inferentially obvious, it is not to be expected that the inductive formulation of criteria will result in the same set of criteria for everybody. If two people start with fundamentally different views of proper basicality, then the rules that they construct on those views will also be quite different.

They may even be incompatible. However, since a person’s rules derive from her views, she can hardly expect her rules to apply to someone who starts with a fundamentally different set of examples. This seems to imply that a belief might be rationally accepted as basic by one person but equally rationally rejected by another. Again, it all depends on which set of beliefs is initially taken as obviously properly basic.

3. Conclusion

Platinga rejects a certain criterion for proper basicality, since he believes that God is properly basic, but he does not argue for a certain criteria. But one does not need to argue for a certain criterion in order to be justified in rejecting another. A person needs to start where he is at when taking the beliefs he has and coming up with a criteria for proper basicality. For Christians, this will include God’s being properly basic, but it will not include the Great Pumpkin or some other belief that does not seem basic to the Christian.

1Cf. Alvin Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God (henceforth RBG),” in Reason and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 16-93; “Is Belief in God Rational?,” in Rationality and Religious Belief, ed. C. F. Delaney (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), 1979, pp. 7-29; “Is Belief in God Properly Basic?,” Nous 15 (1981): pp. 41-51.
2RGB p. 27.
3Plantinga, “Is Belief in God Rational?” p. 27.
4RBG 47-63.
5Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1a pars, q. 84, a. 2; RBG 40f and 92 n. 28.
6RGB p. 59.
7Ibid., pp. 59-63.
8Ibid., p. 74.
9Ibid.
10Ibid., pp. 76-78.
11Plantinga, “Is Belief in God Properly Basic?”, p. 48.
12Ibid., p. 50.
13For a detailed discussion of two options, see Roderick Chisholm, The
Problem of the Criterion (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press), 1973.
14RBG p. 79.
15Ibid., p. 77.
16Ibid., p. 80.
17For a discussion of Plantinga’s notion of noetic structure, see RBG pp. 48-50; “A person’s noetic structure is the set of propositions he believes together with certain epistemic relations that hold among him and these propositions.” Plantinga analyzes the noetic structure from the point of view of foundationalism in general. There are three ways of classifying the contents of our noetic structure: (1) in terms of basicality; (2) in terms of degree of belief; and (3) in terms of the depth of ingress of a belief.
18RBG p. 79.
19Ibid., p. 81.
20Ibid.
21Plantinga makes a distinction between evidence and non-evidential ground. Evidence consists of beliefs on the basis of which other, non-basic beliefs are held, whereas grounds are not beliefs at all, but conditions or circumstances that occasion properly basic beliefs, and thereby justify them without being formulated as beliefs. To have evidence for a belief is to hold that belief on the basis of other beliefs which one consciously takes as supporting it. To have grounds for a belief, however, is to hold it in such way that there are conditions in which it arises and that justify it, even though the believer may typically be unaware at the moment of what those conditions are.
22RBG p. 78.

Read More